This paper examines the extent to which local monetary policy stance determines the strength of US monetary policy international transmission to global equities. Using a sample of 35 countries, we document that US monetary policy surprises exert significant inverse effects on global equity returns. Our results suggest that countries whose policy rates are brought into line with that of the US are less sensitive to US monetary policy shocks only when they have a high and intermediate level of cross-border financial linkages, and only when they have a low and intermediate level of exchange rate volatility.
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Introduction.
This paper provides an empirical examination of the international propagation mechanism of US monetary policy shocks to global equity markets. The international dimensions of the Federal Reserve's (Fed) actions have been a topic of continuous scrutiny in the literature, as they carry direct implications for global portfolio allocations, as well as for monetary policymaking. The bulk of research to date has attempted to discern the determinants of global equities' reaction to US monetary policy shocks by conditioning the strength of the transmission, mainly, to the degree of countries' cross-border real and financial integration, and to the flexibility of their exchange rate (e.g., Ammer, Vega, and Wongswan, 2010; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Wongswan, 2009 ). The present study adds to the existing evidence by examining the extent to which local monetary policy stance determines the strength of US monetary policy international transmission.
The present study builds on a long and extensive literature, which, typically, pursues a twofold objective. First, it attempts to establish the existence of international spillover effects, and second, it seeks to identify the determinants of the strength of these effects. Evidence on the nature of the relationship between US monetary policy and international equity returns is rather robust, with the bulk of evidence pointing to a significant inverse relationship between US monetary policy shocks and foreign stock prices.
1 There is also evidence of a significant link between Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) communications and international equities (Hayo, Kutan and Neuenkirch, 2010, 2012) . Documenting global equities' reaction to US monetary policy shocks and FOMC communications can reveal the extent to which US monetary policy can affect common and country-specific business cycle and asset price fluctuations (Lastrapes, 1998) . The motivation for the second objective arises from ongoing efforts to uncover the proper course of actions that a country must pursue in order to internalise the externalities associated with US monetary policy (Canova, 2005) . To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to test formally the implications of bringing into line ("synchronising") local policy rates with that of the US for the strength of the US monetary policy transmission to global equities.
The posited channels through which US monetary policy affects foreign firms' cash flows and discount rates can be complex, and the ultimate result on global equity prices is uncertain a priori. For instance, US monetary policy shocks can have significant inverse effects on global equity prices through their impact on the international interest rates, as the latter are used to discount foreign firms' future cash flows. 2 Simultaneously, however, international interest rate adjustments following innovations to Fed's actions might pass through to exchange rates via uncovered interest rate parity, and also affect foreign firms' cash flows by altering domestic goods' competitiveness. But the impact of these two channels on global equity prices can be offsetting, and their relative importance difficult to predict beforehand (Wongswan, 2009) . In a similar vein, innovations to US monetary policy stance can also affect foreign equities because they may trigger global portfolio rebalancing due to changes in the relative returns of global assets (Lastrapes, 1998) . Finally, to the extent that the developments in US asset markets and macroeconomic conditions are interrelated with those of global economies, US monetary policy can influence expectations about future returns in global assets through its impact on US economic activity (Lastrapes, 1998) .
Intuitively, we expect that countries' sensitivity to externalities associated with US monetary policy is more pronounced when their goods and financial markets are integrated with the rest of world. Furthermore, the nature of a country's exchange rate regime is often 3 couched in discussions about the strength of the international financial transmission of US monetary policy, as it determines the extent to which local interest rates adjust to US monetary policy innovations (Frankel et al., 2004; Shambaugh, 2004) . Against this background, most of the existing research attempts to operationalise an empirical exploration on this subject by conditioning the differential reactions of global equities to US monetary policy shocks to the differences in cross-border real and financial linkages, as well as to the flexibility of the exchange rate regime.
In this context, a number of recent papers document that countries with a higher degree of real (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011) and financial (Bailey, 1990; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011; Wongswan, 2009 ) integration with the rest of the world are more sensitive to US monetary policy shocks. Other research focuses on the way foreign interest rates and exchange rates adjust to global interest rate shocks, and finds that equities of countries with flexible exchange rates respond in a less pronounced way to US monetary policy (Ammer et al., 2010; Bailey, 1990; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011) .
Other factors that can capture the strength of the international financial transmission of US monetary policy include the high degree of equity markets' openness, level of development, riskiness, and the degree of a country's business cycle correlation with the US (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Wongswan, 2009 (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; McCallum, 1994) . Moreover, synchronisation of policy rates can also act as a form of signalling for increased monetary policy cooperation reducing equity risk premia and sensitivity to US monetary policy externalities.
The analysis in the present study proceeds in three steps. First, in subsection 2.1 we explore the relationship between US monetary policy shocks and global equities. Using an event-study framework, consistent with the bulk of existing recent literature (Ammer et al., 2010; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011; Wongswan, 2009) Conover et al., 1999; Mann et al., 2004) . We identify those countries which for a certain period share similar monetary policy conditions with the US. The second approach follows the technique developed by Bergin and Jordà (2004) , and allows to identify those countries whose policy rate changes are more likely to move in the same direction with the Fed's policy rate.
The third step, in subsection 2.3, consists in investigating how country-specific characteristics influence the strength of the international financial transmission of US monetary policy to the countries synchronising their policy rates with that of the US. In this context, we categorise countries according to the degree of their cross-border real and financial linkages as well to the flexibility of their exchange rates, and we analyse the differences. Finally, section 3 offers some concluding remarks.
The response of global equities to US monetary policy shocks.
Baseline event-study results.
We seek to identify the effects of US monetary policy shocks on global equity markets using a pooled regression-based event study approach. The event-study approach has been used extensively in the stream of research which seeks to identify the effects that FOMC announcements elicit on international stock market returns (see inter alia Ammer et al., 2010; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009) . This approach provides the empirical framework for 6 identifying the average effects of FOMC announcement surprises on foreign stock returns.
Moreover, it provides flexibility for capturing the differential response of global equities to US monetary policy shocks across different subsets of a given sample.
The starting point of our analysis is the estimation of the following equation using panel data:
where r j,i is the daily (log) returns of country's j aggregate stock market price index on an FOMC meeting day i, and S i stands for the unexpected component of the monetary policy announcements calculated in a similar manner to Kuttner (2001) . In a similar vein to the existing literature, we obtain ordinary least squares estimates for the average reaction of foreign stock market returns to monetary policy shocks. In addition to this we use the method of Petersen (2009) operating at the zero lower bound adopting unconventional monetary policy practices.
- Table 1 (Ammer et al., 2010; Wongswan, 2009 (1), we employ Thornton's (2013) approach which controls for the possibility that the stock prices and the market-based proxies for monetary policy shocks respond simultaneously to news unrelated to US monetary policy without using intra-day data.
This approach involves the estimation of the following equation:
where X ANN is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 on days of FOMC announcements and zero otherwise, while t refers to all days in our sample and not just to the FOMC announcements days. The results from the estimation of Eq. (2) are reported in Table 1 , and are also indicative of a significant US monetary policy international transmission channel.
The coefficient estimate β 2 , capturing international equities' additional response to US monetary policy shocks on days of FOMC announcements, is statistically significant and negative. Moreover, coefficient estimate β 1 which measures the simultaneous response of 9 global equities and market-based measures for US monetary policy shocks is statistically insignificant.
The benchmark specification of the event-study excludes monetary policy actions taken on unscheduled FOMC meetings. This is because the last tend to be associated with specific circumstances requiring an urgent response from the Fed (Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005) .
Consider for instance, the rate cut on September 17 th 2001, which came as a response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the rate cut on January 22 
where X UN is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 on unscheduled FOMC meeting days and i now includes both scheduled and unscheduled FOMC meeting days. The results from this regression (reported in Table 1 ) do not show a statistically significant marginal reaction of global equities to monetary policy shocks originating from unscheduled FOMC meetings.
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The event-study framework adopted in this paper is based on the implicit assumption that monetary policy news is the only factor driving equity prices on FOMC announcement days. Similar daily or intra-day event-windows have also been employed in previous related studies (Ammer et al., 2010; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Hausman and Wongswan, 2011; Wongswan, 2009 ). The observed daily equity performance, however, might be due to a prolonged episode of increasing or decreasing equity prices in a country, which is unrelated to US monetary policy developments. Thus, to address this possibility and its implications we also consider the relationship between US monetary policy shocks and global equities' 'abnormal' returns. Specifically, we adjust the daily equity returns of each country in our event study by subtracting the mean of their past performance over 3-and 5-days directly preceding the announcement day, and explore their association with US monetary policy surprises. The regression of global equities' abnormal returns on monetary policy surprises yields statistically insignificant reaction estimates, as we show in Table 1 , and challenges existing evidence of a strong passthrough of US monetary policy into global equities. We use this measure of equity performance in the remaining part of the paper to test if this average result holds for all subsets of the sample we are examining in this paper.
The role of domestic monetary policy conditions.
In this section, we seek to identify the extent to which monetary conditions in the non-US countries determine the cross-border differences in the impact of US monetary policy on global equities. We examine whether the commonality, or not, of the monetary policy conditions in the 35 countries from our sample with those of the US influence the strength of US monetary policy international pass-through into international stock markets. An important 4 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this line of analysis.
11 aspect of our analysis in this section is, therefore, the uncovering of the degree of a country's monetary policy interdependence with that of the US. conditions rests is that monetary policy conditions remain unchanged until there is a reverse in the policy rate. In the present study, we relax this assumption, and we also consider a monetary policy inaction phase which starts on a month when a country has left its policy rate unchanged 12 consecutive times. The monetary policy environments of two countries are common when they share similar monetary policy conditions. In Table A .1 in the Appendix,
we provide information about the policy rates used for each country, as well as for their availability. This approach has the advantage of allowing for a time-varying definition of commonality between the monetary policy of a country and that of the US.
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The second approach we use in order to determine the degree of monetary policy interdependence between the US and each one of the countries from our sample is based on Bergin and Jordà's (2004) 
, and strong increase (k 5 ). Thus, we include an additional category to capture the months when no policy rate changes have taken place.
Conditional to the variability of the policy rate changes in each country during the period under consideration, we classify the policy rate changes into these five categories. In particular, for each country we use the classification system shown in Table A .1 of the appendix. For instance, the values that a US monetary policy rate adjustment can take are k 1 = -0.5%, k 2 = -0.25%, k 3 = 0%, k 4 = 0.25%, and k 5 = 0.5%, while those of Mexico are k 1 = -0.75%, k 2 = -0.25%, k 3 = 0%, k 4 = 0.25%, and k 5 = 0.75%.
Based on this classification, we can have for each country 5 different occurrences in every month t. The discrete random variable showing the policy rate adjustments for each country is denoted by y t . The ordered response model proposed by Bergin and Jordà (2004) takes the following form: (2004), we use forward-looking data for inflation and real economic activity in our estimations of the ordered probit model, as they reflect more accurately the forward-looking nature of monetary policy.
- Table 2 To get a better sense of the magnitude of the impact of US monetary policy on the probability of each occurrence of y t , we show, in y decreases the possibility of "strong decreases" and "decreases" in foreign policy rates, while it increases the possibility of "increases" and "strong increases". US monetary policy rate adjustments increase and/or decrease the probability of most outcomes of the discrete random variable y t , but they appear to generate a larger impact on the outcomes of "increases" and "decreases". The only exceptions are Slovenia and the Republic of Korea where we find that they are associated only with "strong decreases" and "increases" respectively.
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The equation by which we assess how the synchronisation of local monetary policy rates with that of the US impacts on the strength of the baseline relationship in Eq. (1), is
where X SYN is a binary dummy variable taking the value of 1 if country j at time i has the same monetary conditions with the US, and zero otherwise. Based on the analysis above, the policy rates synchronisation dummy variable X SYN can take two definitions. First, we use the 6 We thank an anonymous referee for the suggestion to include the months when policy rates were left unchanged and for suggesting the use of forward-looking data in w t . 7 We have also employed the original specification of Bergin and Jordà (2004) in order to identify the countries which are more likely to adjust their monetary policy rates in a similar direction to that in the US. This exercise is conducted in event time and the explanatory variables in vector w t are backward looking. When we repeat the estimations in Tables 3 and 4 using these countries our results are qualitatively similar. For brevity reasons these results are not included here, but are available from the authors upon request.
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time-varying definition of commonality and X SYN takes the value 1 on event days i when the monetary policy conditions in country j, defined using an adaptation of the method of Conover et al. (1999) and Mann et al. (2004) , are similar to those in the US, and zero otherwise. Second, it takes the value of 1 for those countries whose policy rates are more likely to respond in the same direction as the Fed's policy rate that we have identified using the directional model of Bergin and Jordà (2004) described above.
- Table 3 here- Table 3 reports results from the estimation of Eq. (5), and show that on average, and irrespective of which monetary policy synchronisation definition we use, when foreign countries' monetary policy rates are in synch with the US policy rate, the impact of US monetary policy shocks on global equity markets tends to be on average less pronounced.
Specifically, the coefficient estimates β 2 capturing the marginal response of equities in countries whose monetary policy rate moves in tandem with that of the US is positive and statistically significant. In addition, after the interactive term of surprises with the monetary policy synchronisation dummy is included, the magnitude of the international equities' reaction estimate β 1 increases.
In Table 3 we also show the results from Eq. (5) when abnormal returns are employed, and our results are comparable to those obtained when the reaction of daily returns is sought.
In this section, therefore, we show that there is a significant negative relationship between global equities returns (and abnormal returns) and US monetary policy shocks on FOMC announcement days, unless foreign monetary policy rates are in synch with the US monetary policy rate. In that case the impact is less pronounced or even completely diminished as the results from testing if the sum of coefficients β 1 and β 2 is zero, reported in Table 3 , depict.
The role of other forms of interaction among countries
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In the previous section, we have shown that the synchronisation of domestic monetary policy rates with that of the US reduces on average, and even diminishes, the strength of the international transmission of US monetary policy shocks to global equities. In the subsequent part, we proceed to investigate if this result is robust across all countries sharing similar monetary policy conditions with the US. In particular, we investigate if other forms of interaction between a country and the rest of the world can explain why the strength of the transmission channel is reduced in countries with similar monetary policy conditions to those in the US. The factors we consider are the cross-border real and financial linkages of a country, as well as the flexibility of its exchange rate.
To uncover if the muted reaction of global stocks to Fed's unexpected actions can be pinned down to specific countries which share some similar characteristics along with synchronised policy rates with the US, we augment Eq. (5) by adding 3 interactive terms as follows: - Table 4 - Table 4 using abnormal returns instead of daily (log) returns, but this does not change our main results. (3), which now includes both scheduled and unscheduled FOMC meetings announcements, and X UN is 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 on unscheduled FOMC meetings announcements, and zero otherwise. In the fifth and sixth rows of this table we show the results from the estimation of Eq. (1), where r 3-days and r 5-days are the daily equity returns of each country on the 118 announcement days adjusted by subtracting the mean of their past performance over 3-and 5-days directly preceding the announcement day, respectively. Coefficient estimates are obtained by the OLS method, and t-statistics (.) are calculated using the two-dimensional clustered standard errors of Petersen (2009). (4) . The dependent variable captures the magnitude and direction of a country's policy rate adjustment on month t, and can take 5 different values ("strong decrease", "decrease", "inactivity", "increase", "strong increase"), as described in the main body of the text. The independent variables are lagged, and are the following: Inflation stands for the next year's expected inflation rate minus 2% (Consensus Economics), Growth for the next year's expected gross domestic product growth minus 2.5% (Consensus Economics), Eff. XR for the monthly percentage change in a country's effective exchange rate, and US MP is the discrete random variable y US showing the magnitude and direction of the US monetary policy rate adjustment. For countries participating in the Eurozone, we estimate Eq. (4) separately for each country's policy rate for the period before January 1999. After the introduction of the euro in January 1999, we consider the relationship between US monetary policy rate and the policy rate set by the European Central Bank. For Luxembourg for the period before 1999 we use the policy rate set by the National Bank of Belgium. In the parentheses (.) we report the standard errors of the coefficient estimates. (5) . X SYN is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 on days when the monetary policy conditions in a country are similar to those in the US, and zero otherwise. In Panel A, we report the results when X SYN is constructed using the time-varying definition of a country's monetary policy conditions. Specifically, the monetary policy conditions in a country are tightening (easing) for a period which starts on a month with a policy rate hike (cut) and continues until there is a rate cut (hike), while after 12 months of unchanged policy rates we assume a period of monetary policy inactivity. In panel B, X SYN takes the value of 1 for those countries which are more likely to adjust their policy rates in the same direction as the US policy rate, identified by Bergin and Jordà's (2004) 
US equity investment
0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 for a country which at time i is among the one-third of the countries from our sample with the lowest/medium/highest (X LOW /X MED /X HIGH ) level of US equity portfolio investments as a percentage of their market capitalisation, and zero otherwise. [IMF, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, World Bank; annual frequency] .
XR Regime Classification
Using the de facto classification of the exchange regime by Ilzetzki et al. (2010) we define a 0-1 dummy variable X FLEX taking the value of 1 if country j at time i has a flexible exchange rate regime (classification 3 or 4) , and zero otherwise (classification 1 or 2). Analogously X FIXED is a 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 if country j at time i has a less flexible exchange rate regime (classification 1 or 2), and zero otherwise (classification 3 or 4).
XR Regime Volatility
0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 for a country which at time i is among the one-third of the countries from our sample with the lowest/medium/highest (X LOW /X MED /X HIGH ) daily exchange rate changes standard deviation (against the US dollar), and zero otherwise. [WM/Reuters closing spot rates]
Lending from US 0-1 dummy variable taking the value of 1 for a country which at time i is among the one-third of the countries from our sample with the highest amount of lending from the US banking system, and zero otherwise.
[BIS consolidated banking statistics Table 9B; quarterly frequency] 
